This is a reply to CovenantInBlood's post, Sat Aug 26 2006:
My confusion then was your use of Tiessen, since his concern about God's timelessness (how does a timeless God relate to human beings?) seems quite different from your concern. I'm not convinced you can translate Tiessen's concern into these categories of law.
Here’s my perhaps palsied attempt at translating Tiessen’s concern -- “how does a timeless God relate to human beings?” -- into “these categories of law”:
When Tiessen said,
In a significant sense, God is not only determining human history, he is responding to his creatures within it.
he was claiming the existence of a feedback loop in which God responds to the acts of creatures. Within a legal framework, any act of any creature can be treated by a court as a
fact. Courts exist to apply
laws to
facts. Tiessen is claiming that there’s a feedback loop between God and
facts that are created by His creatures. To my understanding, in God’s eternal, flawless court, there is little need to distinguish between
law and
fact. God foreordained everything, so all
facts are generated by His
laws. So in His perfect realm, there are no
facts in operation devoid of the
laws that give rise to such
facts.
Tiessen continues by saying,
This divine responsiveness is facilitated by God’s knowledge of how creatures would act in particular circumstances (so called ‘middle knowledge’). God not only knows the actual future, he has determined that future. But in order to do this, God needed to know how his creatures would respond to situations, including their response to his own persuasions or actions. God can know this because his creatures are not libertarianly free and he must know this in order to plan how he will act to bring about his purposes. With simple foreknowledge God would know the future but would be unable to do anything about it. With ‘middle knowledge’ God is able to plan and then to accomplish his plan without violating the responsible freedom he has given to his creatures.
Tiessen hereby describes God’s dependency on
facts that are created by creatures. Creatures have the illusion (or delusion?) of
free-will. Their acts that are
facts in the creatures’ eyes are outworkings of
laws that are foreordained in God’s eyes.
The way that I look at it, “middle knowledge” is unnecessary because God doesn’t need to distinguish
law from
fact. Humans must recognize a distinction between
law and
fact (e.g.,
U.S. Constitution Article III § 2 cl 1) because we are slow to understand how
laws apply to
facts. We go through a process of contemplating, inducing, deducing, etc., before we recognize how
law applies to
fact. Since God foreordained everything, there is no split between
law and
fact in Him. Saying what I think is the same thing in Pilgrim’s words, “God’s ‘foreknowledge’ is inseparably linked and is derived from His eternal decree”. In God, the linkage between the
law and
fact is automatic, instantaneous, and inseparable. Tiessen’s right in saying that God’s “creatures are not libertarianly free”. Even so, God has no more need for “middle knowledge” with respect to human beings than He needs “middle knowledge” with respect to rocks. Rocks are not morally accountable because they don’t need to figure out how to apply
law to
fact. Humans ARE morally accountable because we DO need to figure out how to apply
law to
fact. God already knows how to apply
law to
fact with regard to everything; so He doesn’t even need to recognize the distinction between
law and
fact, except for the sake of communicating with flawed creatures like ourselves. So Pilgrim’s response to Tiessen’s “compatibilist account”, IMO, is correct:
The critical error made in that statement is that God's actions in time are determined by the actions willed by the creature; in other words, in this view only certain things were preordained in eternity; the rest of history is done in time and space and all dependent upon the decisions made by men.
Secondly, this view is at variance with the biblical and traditional Calvinist view concerning "foreknowledge". God's foreknowledge is dependent upon and the result of foreordination; i.e., God's eternal decree. God "foreknows" simply because He has determined all things in eternity.
God’s desire (not need) to communicate with flawed creatures for the sake of redeeming some is the vehicle through which His “highly relational personal being” appears to such flawed creatures. He appears as a covenant-maker and
law-giver. He condescends from the timeless -- i.e., from the realm in which death doesn’t exist because sin doesn’t exist -- for the sake of communicating His priorities in time -- i.e., to creatures with short, sin-soaked lives. Like you say, God is “Lord of Time”. He condescends into our time-bound realm as an outworking of the
covenant of redemption. In condescending from the eternal, sinless, deathless realm into the time-bound, sin-filled, death-filled realm, God separates
law from
fact, not in His own mind, or in His own being, but purely for the sake of expressing His “highly relational personal being” to people who don’t understand sufficiently how
law should apply to
fact.
By being unwaveringly committed to God’s foreordination of everything, it’s possible to understand God’s “highly relational personal being” by studying the “history of the work of redemption”, rather than by concocting dubious doctrines like “middle knowledge”. God’s knowledge of
facts is inseparable from His eternal
law, at least from His perspective. But the “history of the work of redemption” is a history of God’s training humans how to apply
law to
fact, so that at the resurrection of the dead, the relationship between
law and
fact is as normal and natural to the resurrected as it is to the Almighty.
(E)ven God's eternal law has temporal aspects; for example, murder was not possible outside of time and before creation, nor was the sanctification of one day in seven, nor the worship of idols nor the taking of God's name in vain, etc. These laws are eternal not so much because they exist outside of time, but because they are reflections of God's eternal (unchanging) character, and this is where their foundation lies. For a man to murder or break the Sabbath or worship idols or dishonor his parents or lie is to distort and break the image of God in which he was made--but he can't do any of these things except in time.
To which I say, “Amen!”, and thanks for the clarification.
(A)s far as I'm aware ... covenant theology has always been concerned with temporal issues as well--necessarily, since the covenants play out in time. ... The eternal is the foundation of the temporal; God's eternal decrees are realized temporally.
I agree. I’m not trying to smear covenant theology by making the criticisms of it that I’ve made. I’m just trying to fine-tune it for the sake of having it address a set of problems that to date, it hasn’t addressed well.
Do we refuse to understand the didactic meanings of the Mosaic religious ceremonies because they are chronologically earlier than the writing of the Book of Hebrews? Later revelation frequently sheds light on earlier revelation.
I think the Book of Hebrews makes it clear that the Mosaic religious ceremonies have an educational value that we should not ignore. I agree that later revelation “sheds light on earlier revelation”. I think the relationship between the later and the earlier becomes crucial when we start considering the
jurisdictions of the various covenants. --- In order for a court to establish that it has
jurisdiction over a given
legal action, it’s necessary for the court to establish (i)that it has expertise in the
subject matter, i.e., that it has
subject matter jurisdiction; (ii)that it has authority over the given person, i.e., that it has
in personam jurisdiction; and (iii)that it has authority within the given
venue. --- IMHO, this pattern exists in Scripture as well as in reliable human legal systems. If this is the case, then for a biblical covenant, say, the Mosaic Covenant, to have
jurisdiction over a given
legal action, it needs to have
jurisdiction over the
subject matter,
in personam, and over the
venue. This issue is chronology-sensitive in a way that didactic application of Hebrews to the Mosaic Covenant is not.
When you say,
We don't reinterpret Gen. 9:6 in light of Lev. 20:13 because the latter has nothing to do with murder.
I have to agree. My hypothetical application of Lev. 20:13 to Gen. 9:6 was inappropriate. I should have stayed with the original example, the applicability of Genesis 9:6 to Cain’s murder of Abel. --- If we claim that the didactic value of Genesis 9:6 should be used to reinterpret Cain’s murder, we cannot exercise that claim without violating
jurisdictions that are clearly stated in Scripture. According to Genesis 9, the Noachian Covenant applies to the post-diluvian human race (Genesis 9:8-9; NASB):
Then God spoke to Noah and to his sons with him, saying, “Now behold, I Myself do establish My covenant with you, and with your descendants after you”
Since the Genesis 9:6 mandate against bloodshed is a term of this covenant, it has the same
jurisdictional boundaries as the covenant. Genesis 9:6 certainly has didactic value in its application to Cain’s murder. But to claim that it has
jurisdiction, as
human law, is to ignore the
in personam jurisdiction of the Noachian Covenant.