No, it would appear that you haven't comprehended the views, unless of course you disagree with Louis Berkhof who wrote:
"Was the first sin of man, consituting his fall, predestined, or was this merely the object of divine foreknowledge? In their original form Supralapsarianism held the former and Infralapssarianism, the latter" (Systematic Theology, p. 118).
Therefore, your following statement is not true:
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Further, the fact according to the Infra scheme, that God actually decreed the Fall and and then elected and predestinated a remnant to be saved, does not negate the fact that it was God's eternal counsel and not some fictitious prescience of events which didn't exist that determined who would be saved.
You wrote:
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What you are proposing reminds me of something out of the fictional "StarTrek" series.
And equally, Arminians would believe that what you are proposing is a show of the grand Puppeteer, who pulls all of our strings and manipulates our decisions... but neither absurd illustrations strengthen either arguments.
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However, what I will say is that even if for the sake of argument, I accepted your premise, i.e., that based upon the foreseen actions of men God determined all things, it would still mitigate against your view for a couple of reasons. (1) If God determines what shall be, then NOTHING can change that and thus "free-will" cannot exist. For God's decree fixes ALL things, including secondary causes and thus any decisions made by men are also fixed and not "free".
Open Theists use the same arguments as Calvinists: foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom, although the former denies foreknowledge whilst the latter denies libertarian freedom. However, God's foreknowledge does not cause human decisions or actions. To quote an illustration I used in my paper:
God can foreknow that I will choose to put ham on my bread instead of jam. However, God's foreknowledge does not cause me to choose ham instead of jam; it only renders my free choice as being certain, not necessary. Given the fact of contingency (two possible choices), I could have chosen strawberry jam.
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OR, (2) If the will of men are nonetheless "free", i.e., they are capable of acting contrary to a person's nature, then it is impossible that the end could be absolutely sure. Just these two items alone put you in an inescapable conundrum which none have been able to escape. Other insurmountable problems could be mentioned, e.g., biblical prophecy would be an impossibility, as it could never be guaranteed that it would be perfectly fulfilled in manner or time, etc.
First of all, I question your definition of being "free", viz. "capable of acting contrary to a person's nature". The main premise of libertarian freedom is that man can only be free if he "could have chosen otherwise". This does NOT mean that our choices are made without the presence of influences. Rather, it means that our choices are made without being causally determined by those influences so that in the end we could have chosen otherwise.
Secondly, is it "impossible that the end could be absolutely sure"? I don't think so. For example, God has determined to bring about the New Heavens and the New Earth, and no libertarian freedom will change that!
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When the Confessions state that God "allows" certain acts of men, it has no reference to some fictitious "foreknowlege" of foreseen events, but rather it is speaking of the manner/means by which God providentially brings these acts to pass; e.g., using secondary causes, which the WCF, for example, makes clear.
So does God really foreordain people to sin by choosing the means (e.g. circumstances, desires, motives, etc.) to convince individuals, without constraint, to act contrary to God's law (such as murder)?
However, if humans willingly sin because of their corrupt nature, then there is no reason why it should be said that God foreordains or determines us to sin. Our sinful desires and thoughts are thus controlled and determined by our nature, not by God.
